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What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?
Todd Greentree

©2021 Todd Greentree

A BSTR AC T: Cr it ics of t he A fgha n wa r have c la imed it was a lway s
unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was
fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and the US
approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the f inal decade of the
Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of strategy could
have made America’s longest foreign war unnecessary and is a warning for
the wars we will f ight in the future.

W

Introduction: The Judgment of Failure

hat went wrong in Afghanistan? Why did a nation predominant
in all instruments of power, priding itself on winning its wars,
lose to an inferior and unpopular extremist movement? This
scenario was not the first time the United States blundered into misfortune
under such circumstances. And it is unlikely to be the last. Self-inflicted defeat
is a serious problem because there will be no guarantee of escaping consequences
the next time, especially if we again ignore the basic dictates of strategy. For
this reason, it is prudent to remember the wars we have fought may foreshadow
the kind of wars we will fight in the future, even as the United States refocuses
on great-power competition and the prospect of a major war.
The Afghan war is exceptionally well documented through authoritative
histories, official reports of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, and social science research into the empirical problems of
“proxy war.” 1 Yet, lacking the agony of defeat, the loss in Afghanistan may well
be forgotten. 2
While military and civilian leaders voiced compelling reasons to continue
in Afghanistan, despite the improbability of reversing the Taliban onslaught,
This article benefited enormously from comments by Kalev Sepp, Frank Hoffman, Bruce Hoffman, Emile Nakhleh,
Carter Malkasian, and Hew Strachan.
1. Theo Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (London: Vintage, 2017); Eli Berman
and David A. Lake, eds., Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2019); Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan: A History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2021); Craig Whitlock, The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2021); and Eli Berman et al., Deterrence with Proxies, Minerva Research Initiative, research project, https://
minerva.defense.gov/Research/Funded-Projects/Article/1699260/deterrence-with-proxies/.
2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUS), The 9/11 Commission Report:
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, official government ed.
(Washington, DC: NCTAUS, 2004), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-911REPORT.
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they did not sway President Joseph Biden’s belief that Afghanistan was
no longer worth the cost, even if leaving meant risking a rise in terrorism
and abandoning progress that had benefited so many Afghans. However
dishonorable the endgame, the president’s decision to withdraw on the
twentieth anniversary of 9/11 relieved the United States of a distraction
from the increasing pressures of great-power competition, at least for the
time being. Though the withdrawal seems an embarrassment in the short
term, Eliot Cohen is right to note a long-term judgment of the Afghan
war remains premature. 3 Unfortunately, it is not too soon to measure the
immediate costs of strategic failure: approximately 2,324 American military
deaths and $1 trillion expended, excluding the price tags of three dozen
other coalition members; sanctioned violence that resulted in a grossly
disproportionate body count on the order of 160,000 Afghans against
the 2,996 people who died on 9/11; an overly ambitious democratic
state-building project in shambles; Islamic extremists strengthened instead
of weakened; and a vacuum in an unstable region left to be filled by
adversarial parties such as China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. 4
To take stock of America’s protracted commitment to this bloody, messy
war, one criterion above all is indispensable—results. To what degree did
the United States achieve its policy goals in Afghanistan? Proponents of
withdrawal emphasize, no matter the contentious outcome, counterterrorist
operations met the original aim of degrading al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations sufficiently and any recrudescence can now be handled from
offshore. They argue, further, the war was always unwinnable and, in any
case, continued involvement in combating the Taliban was futile. However
compelling, these judgments insufficiently account for the policy, strategy,
and performance deficiencies that yielded strategic failure. How accurately
did US administrations conceive the nature and character of the war? Were
alternatives to the chosen course of action considered? How timely were
reassessment and adaptation? Were relations with allies and the partner
government optimally managed? How effectively employed were the
instruments of power? Did the United States act against its interests?
Another crucial issue regarding results is evident—failure was not
inevitable. Afghans, no matter their shortfalls, are not to blame. The
shock of 9/11 and the legacies of earlier wars forgotten or misremembered
3. Eliot A. Cohen, “Exit Strategy,” Atlantic, April 13, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04
/exit-strategy/618590/.
4. US Department of Defense, Casualty Status, updated October 13, 2021, https://www.defense.gov
/casualty.pdf; “ Costs of War,” Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, updated October 15,
2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/; and United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA), Reports on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conf lict (Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA,
2008–21), https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports.
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explain, but do not excuse, those in positions of authority who should
have known better. The United States was not misled in Afghanistan but
rather bears responsibility for its strategic myopia.

The Afghan War: Unwinnable—The Way It Was Fought
Although often overlooked, America’s longest foreign war did not
begin in 2001, but over 40 years ago as a war within the global Cold War.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, they became
enmeshed in a creeping intervention to stabilize a communist revolution
that confronted a rising Islamic backlash and was spinning out of control.
While the United States levied a panoply of sanctions to punish Moscow,
the only one to endure was President Jimmy Carter’s authorization
of covert action to arm the nascent mujahideen, whom Carter called
“freedom fighters.” 5 The mujahideen thrived with President Ronald
Reagan and CIA Director Bill Casey’s embrace of anti-communist
insurgents and the largesse of “Charlie Wilson’s War.” 6 With Pakistan
as the controlling agent, Saudi Arabia and other contributors matched
the CIA program dollar for dollar and launched a parallel program to
keep Islamic extremists—including Osama bin Laden—away from Mecca
by helping them fight jihad in Afghanistan. 7 The mujahideen turned
the Afghan war into the Soviet’s “bleeding wound,” compelled their
withdrawal in 1989, and contributed to the bankruptcy and collapse of the
Soviet system in 1991. 8
The strategy imposed high costs on the Soviets. The costs to Afghans,
however, were even more extreme: approximately five million refugees,
5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, to President Jimmy Carter, memorandum, December 26, 1979, document
now declassified, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall
_of_detente/doc73.pdf; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents
and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 142–43; Odd Arne Westad, The
Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 288–330; and Vladimir Snegirev and Valery Samunin, The Dead End: The Road
to Afghanistan, trans. and ed. Svetlana Savranskaya and Malcolm Byrne (Washington, DC: National
Security Archive, 2012), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/.
6. George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003); and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret Story of the CIA, Afghanistan,
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
7. Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015); and
Kim Ghattas, The Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion,
and Collective Memory in the Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2020), 2, 71–90.
8. Mikhail Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 45; Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the
CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 316–18; CIA, USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan,
special national intelligence estimate, March 24, 1988, document now declassified, https://www.cia.gov
/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005564723.pdf; Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, eds., Afghanistan
and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989: 20 Years Later (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2009),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/; and Bruce Riedel, What We Won: America’s Secret
War in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), x, 152.
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one million dead, and civil war among the divisive mujahideen, who had
no political project and were unprepared to govern. When US efforts
to reconcile seven competing factions floundered, the United States
abandoned Afghanistan. 9 The most devout among the mujahideen
reformed themselves into the Taliban and, aided by Pakistan, campaigned
to restore order to Afghanistan. They seized Kandahar as their religious
center and then Kabul in September 1996. Declaring themselves an Islamic
Emirate, they launched a brutal fundamentalist regime that governed by
delivering a rough form of Sharia justice. They also welcomed the return
of bin Laden.
The mujahideen had served America’s purpose as anti-Soviet proxies,
and no one at the time raised serious concerns regarding the risks of
Islamic jihad. It would have required clairvoyance to see how these seeds of
the Cold War would bear the poisonous fruit of terrorism in 2001. It was
equally inconceivable the second US intervention in Afghanistan would—
like the Soviets—flounder, dragging along dozens of coalition members
and perpetuating another 20 years of Afghan tragedy. This unanticipated
sum of contingencies should not obscure the central problem: Afghanistan
was unwinnable—the way it was fought. 10
Operation Enduring Freedom started well. The invasion of Afghanistan
began on October 7, 2001, with just cause and clear aims as Commander in
Chief George W. Bush had ordered: destroy al-Qaeda, which had attacked
the United States on 9/11, and overthrow the Islamic Emirate, which
had hosted them. As it had in the 1980s, the CIA took the lead with a small
number of paramilitary operatives, alongside US and allied special operations
forces, and directed airpower armed with precision-guided munitions to
support allied Afghan ground forces in the north and south. By early December,
they had routed al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It was a conventional victory
achieved through unconventional means, but as Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld proclaimed, it was not the triumph of a revolution in military affairs.11
Political-diplomatic action complemented military success. While air and
ground operations proceeded, regional state representatives and other members
of the international community, led by State Department troubleshooter James
Dobbins, convened with a multiethnic, multifactional array of Afghans under
9. Coll, Ghost Wars, 336–52; and Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and
the Failures of Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 243–66.
10. NCTAUS, 9/11 Commission Report, 254–65; Bruce Hoffman, “The War on Terror 20
Years on: Crossroads or Cul-De-Sac?,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, March 18, 2021,
https://institute.global/policy/war-terror-20-years-crossroads-or-cul-de-sac.
11. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); and Robert L. Grenier, 88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary (New York:
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2016).
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UN auspices in Bonn, Germany.12 During negotiations, they reconstituted
Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic and endorsed American-anointed Hamid
Karzai as its interim president. In this early phase, force and diplomacy
succeeded by acting in harmony.
The model was not proxy war, but a joint venture in which, despite
great asymmetries and wildly disparate cultures, international and
Afghan partners shared resources, risks, and common interests—at least
in principle.
After this venture, the way was lost. In December 2001, reluctance to
concentrate available US forces in the mountains of Tora Bora enabled bin
Laden to escape to Pakistan.13 In March 2002, Operation Anaconda in the remote,
cold, and high-altitude Shah-i-Khot Valley eliminated the final resisting
concentrations of al-Qaeda and Taliban. The unexpectedly difficult and
prolonged battle, however, foreshadowed the challenges of fighting an elusive
and determined enemy in the arduous conditions of Afghanistan.14
On the political side, the joint venture quickly ran into trouble and never fully
consolidated. Afghanistan’s multiethnic Islamic population, with its fractious
political clans and society corroded by warfare and misgovernment, paired poorly
with the institutional and liberal transformation envisoned by Western statebuilding efforts. Despite meaningful progress, this mash-up produced the worst
of both worlds: pervasive corruption fueled by billions of dollars of foreign aid;
multiple actors—including the United States—vying simultaneously to constrain
some warlords while patronizing others; and intractable friction between a
half-conceived democracy stitched to a hyper-centralized state presided over
by a president with quasi-monarchical prerogatives but limited authority.15 By
2009, trust had eroded so deeply Ambassador Karl Eikenberry sent two highly
classified cables addressed personally to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
containing a litany of complaints about America’s Afghan partners and criticizing

12. James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Potomac Books,
2008).
13. Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today: A Report to Members of the US
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Print 111–35 (November 30, 2009), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53709/html/CPRT-111SPRT53709.htm; and Dalton Fury,
Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander’s Account of the Hunt for the World’s Most Wanted Man (London:
St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009).
14. Adam Geibel, “Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2–10 March 2002,” Military
Review (May–June 2002): 72–77; Paul L. Hastert, “Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of
Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 1 (2005): 11–20; and Lester W. Grau and Dodge Billingsley,
Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011).
15. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2010); and Jonathan L. Lee, Afghanistan: A History from 1260 to the Present (London: Reaktion Books, 2018).
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President Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner.” When the cables leaked,
they prompted analogies to what went wrong in Vietnam.16
Bringing order should have been an overriding priority; however, the
strategic behavior of the United States became its source of instability. Behind
affirmations of national interest and rational calculus, fear and passion drove
the US response to 9/11. The so-called Global War on Terrorism was doubly
misconceived—first, as an existential fight of good versus evil, and second, as a
war against terror, which is a method rather than an enemy. With Americans
rallying to avenge 9/11, the Bush administration funneled national purpose into a
grand strategy of counterterrorism. Critically, American power concentrated this
narrow and extrinsic interest initially on Afghanistan, where it conflated the
Taliban with the hunt for al-Qaeda. The scheme to invade Iraq and bring
democracy to the Middle East reduced Afghanistan to a secondary theater and
inadvertently led allies creeping into not one but two quagmires.
Fixed on rooting out terrorists but leery of the “graveyard of empires” myth,
US leaders disdained so-called nation building as a job for lesser powers.17 British
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government took the vanguard, attempting to merge
military action with the liberal world order and convincing NATO to invoke its
Article 5 collective defense clause for the first time.18 While special operations
forces fought the Global War on Terrorism, coalition countries joined the separate
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), signing up for remaining ad hoc
tasks such as conducting armed development in Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Dragged reluctantly into it, the Bush administration acquiesced to investing in
these wider undertakings; however, it persistently overestimated both the utility of
force and America’s ability to transform the nature of Afghanistan.19

Accidental Guerrillas and Accidental Counterinsurgents
One misconception led to another: al-Qaeda was defeated, its remnants on
the run; the Taliban had ceased fighting, its emirate overthrown; the situation
demanded stabilization. But bringing order to Afghanistan conflicted with
16. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in
Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972), 18–30; Karl W. Eikenberry, US ambassador to
Afghanistan, to Hillary Clinton, secretary of state, “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns,” November 2009, in
“Ambassador Eikenberry’s Cables on US Strategy in Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 5, 2010; and Don
Snow, “Watching Karzai, Seeing Diem,” Atlantic Council, April 8, 2010, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs
/new-atlanticist/watching-karzai-seeing-diem/.
17. Dobbins, After the Taliban, 125; and Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010).
18. Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89–92.
19. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Vintage Books, 2008);
and James M. Dubik, Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan, report 2 (Washington, DC: Institute for the
Study of War, 2009), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07878.
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hunting terrorists. As foreign forces flowed in, they searched for combat. Most
Pashtuns who sided with the Taliban had little sympathy for the Arabs of
al-Qaeda or interest in international terrorism and tolerated the coalition because
of their promise to end the chaos in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, all former and
suspected Taliban became residual targets for indiscriminate coalition manhunting
supported by ample airpower and assisted with mixed enthusiasm and motives by
Afghan security forces and warlord militias. Thousands of Taliban suspects filled
prisons in Afghanistan, and they—not al-Qaeda or other terrorists—became the
largest category of prisoners at Guantanamo.20 While rooting out fighters in the
corners of Pashtun tribal lands, incidents such as serial bombings of wedding
parties and government delegations led to tens of thousands of civilian casualties
over the years.21 Popular grievances grew, and the insurgency revived.
David Kilcullen coined a fitting aphorism: Afghans were accidental guerrillas,
fighting foreign infidels because they happened to be in their space.22 The same
was true in reverse. The United States and its coalition partners became accidental
counterinsurgents, fighting the Taliban for its support of al-Qaeda, which violated
our space in the 9/11 attack. Viewed in this manner, the Afghan war, with one
warrior culture attacking another, was literally an accident.
What, exactly, was fighting the Taliban expected to achieve? The mission
became vague and open-ended but was prosecuted on an urgent timeline,
confused with counterterrorism but intended somehow to build a stable and
democratic Afghanistan by defeating insurgents who presented no direct
threat to the United States and its partners. Neither was it clear how means
matched ends: a fundamental source of strategic error. For the better part of two
decades, ISAF struggled to hold the initiative, carrying out stabilization and
reconstruction missions but never able to abandon combat operations. For most
of that time, Afghanistan was an economy of force operation conducted to
manage the war at low cost and sacrifice. Contradictorily, commanders and troops
strove to assert control with extremely expensive combat power one valley and
one Groundhog Day at a time while aspiring to win Afghan hearts and minds. In

20. New York Times, “The Guantánamo Docket,” New York Times, updated October 14, 2021, https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/guantanamo-bay-detainees.html.
21. UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
22. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009).
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fact, throughout most of the war what passed for strategy was reactive and
amounted, as Hew Strachan explained, to a succession of operations.23
There were limits to the utility of force in what British General Rupert
Smith called “war amongst the people.”24 Nonetheless, with the exception
of Special Forces, this realization came slowly and very late. It took America
until 2006 to recognize the Taliban had regrouped, and then another three
years, including a presidential election followed by nearly a year of study and
deliberation, before the United States adapted. In 2009, eight years into the war,
General Stanley McChrystal issued his ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency
Guidance, while General David Petraeus, who replaced McChrystal in 2010, had
previously presided over the much-anticipated publication of Counterinsurgency
Field Manual (FM) 3-24.25 Their revised approach placed protecting the
population ahead of firepower, derived from the lesson experience had taught
the hard way: attrition is an insufficient strategy because killing and capturing
provokes more insurgents. The new strategy, in fact, represented the belated
revival of Foreign Internal Defense and Internal Defense and Development:
US doctrines with pedigrees that predate World War II and the Cold War.26
With the Taliban rampant, however, there seemed little choice other than
getting ahead of the curve by going big—the same purportedly miraculous
strategy that had rescued Iraq from chaos in 2007.27 In December 2009, President
Barack Obama announced a surge that would bring combined US and coalition
troops in Afghanistan to 130,000, along with a notional target of increasing
Afghan security forces to 400,000.28 For a brief period, force ratios and force
employment aligned to reverse the deteriorating security situation. Not only was
this escalation patently unsustainable, by declaring the surge would end in 18
months, Obama inadvertently created a strategic paradox. Everyone understood
23. Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,” Survival 52,
no. 5 (2010): 157–82.
24. Rupert Smith, “Interview with General Sir Rupert Smith,” International Review of the Red Cross 88,
no. 864 (December 2006): 719–27.
25. Michael T. Hall and Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
(Washington, DC: NATO, 2009), https://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance
.pdf; and The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24
/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
26. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-22 (Washington, DC: JCS,
2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_22pa.pdf?ver=2018-10-10-112450-103;
and US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12–15 (Washington, DC:
Department of the Navy, 1940).
27. William A. Knowlton Jr., The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 2010).
28. “President Obama on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” White House,
December 1, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama
-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan; US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability
in Afghanistan, a report prepared in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act, June 2020, https://
media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002348001/-1/-1/1/ENHANCING_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY_IN_
AFGHANISTAN.PDF, 29; and Jens Stoltenberg, “Speech” (speech, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Lisbon,
Portugal, October 11, 2021), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_187391.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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what this decision meant. For ISAF, there would be no time to execute a
conditions-based strategy.29 Conversely, the Taliban knew it would suffer but
merely had to wait for the preordained drawdown, which it did.
Although the US national security system appeared to work in Afghanistan,
an astoundingly disconnected institutional apparatus left myriad contradictions
unmanaged and magnified the complexities of the war.30 Examples abound.
Despite the prescriptions of FM 3-24, the US military was so oriented
to warfighting even money became a “weapons system,” while foreign aid
fostered a corrupt and dependent rentier state.31 Counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operated at cross-purposes, while illegal opium production
remained the country’s second-largest source of revenue, much of it flowing
into Taliban coffers.32 The United States paid handsomely for Pakistan’s
cooperation while lacking the leverage to stem its duplicitous support for
the Taliban.33 Organizationally, while the primacy of political strategy
and whole of government was praised excessively, friction-filled bureaucratic
politics persisted in Washington and Kabul. In the absence of unity of
command, unity of effort was a second-best solution as military
predominance, combined with an insurmountable lack of civilian capacity and
authority, remained a source of civil-military estrangement.
Despite sincere intentions, the United States never did overcome the
course initially set under George W. Bush. To America, Afghanistan remained
Chinatown, a battlefield more than it ever was a nation.34 Nothing symbolized
this analogy more than the ISAF fortifications that encircled the country.
As expedient as they were for protecting troops and serving as operational
29. Craig Whitlock, “At War with the Truth,” in Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers.
30. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1979); Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and
US Policy, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL30588 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 21,
2010); Todd Greentree, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of
Strategy in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 325–56; and Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), https://www.sigar.mil.
31. Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, handbook
no. 09-27 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 2009); Scott Smith and Colin
Cookman, eds., State Strengthening in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned, 2001–14 (Washington, DC: US Institute
for Peace, 2016); and Kate Clark, The Cost of Support to Afghanistan: Considering Inequality, Poverty and Lack
of Democracy through the ‘Rentier State’ Lens, special report (Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2020),
https: / / www.afghanistan - analysts.org /en /reports /economy - development - environment /the - cost - of - support - toafghanistan-new-special-report-considers-the-causes-of-inequality-poverty-and-a-failing-democracy/.
32. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Counterinsurgency, Counternarcotics, and Illicit Economies in Afghanistan:
Lessons for State-Building,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed.
Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 189–209;
and Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, June 2018), https://
www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/counternarcotics/index.html.
33. Daniel Markey, “America’s Perennial Pakistan Problem: Why Washington Failed to Win Over
Islamabad—and Prevent a Taliban Victory,” Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/afghanistan/2021-09-09/americas-perennial-pakistan-problem.
34. Todd Greentree, “Triple Feature: A Letter from Kandahar,” American Interest VI, no. 5 (May/June 2011):
110–16, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/05/01/triple-feature-a-letter-from-kandahar/.
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platforms, these ubiquitous, cheap, and temporary Hesco bastions lacked the
one message Afghans needed most—a sense of enduring commitment.35 In
the end, they were easier to abandon than they were to erect.
After a long flirtation with negotiations, the alibi for exit that ubiquitous
Afghan-American middleman Zalmay Khalilzad finally achieved in February
2020 was profoundly deficient. The agreement legitimized the Taliban by dealing
with its leaders directly, humiliated the government by excluding it, and committed
the United States to full withdrawal on dubious Taliban promises to dissociate
itself from al-Qaeda and hold national peace talks.
The uncritically accepted notion that Afghanistan, somehow, was an endless
war is a fallacy. What drives effort, sacrifice, and duration in war is the perception
of what is at stake.36 All wars end; how they end matters most.37 Exit is not
war termination, and negotiated withdrawal is not negotiated peace. These are
matters of strategic choice. Three presidential administrations—Bush, Obama,
and Trump—wished to lower the stakes in Afghanistan but did not. The Biden
administration finally did so decisively. Withdrawal, accompanied by rapid
government collapse and Taliban victory in the summer of 2021, was merely
the culmination.

Afghanistan: The Small COIN Option
Could Afghanistan have been a success instead of a failure? An option to Big
COIN was certainly available. But, like the lessons of Vietnam, this option was
forgotten in the diversion to counterterrorism, except in the collective memory of
Special Forces and a few others.38 In the accidental creeping counterinsurgency
early on, small COIN was never seriously considered. There is no guarantee it
would have worked in Afghanistan, but there was a precedent.
El Salvador in the 1980s was the single major US commitment to
counterinsurgency between Vietnam and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The intervention was bloody, messy, and controversial, but it succeeded.
Admittedly, this conclusion has long been disputed on the grounds that a decade
of US support to the Armed Forces of El Salvador was insufficient to defeat
35. David Betz, “Citadels and Marching Forts: How Non-Technological Drivers Are Pointing Future Warfare
towards Techniques from the Past,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2, no. 1 (April 17, 2019): 33–34,
https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.25.
36. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1973), 92.
37. Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
38. Linda Robinson, “How Afghanization Can Work,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 2, 2011,
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/how-afghanization-can-work; H-Diplo, “Forum 9 on ‘What Have We
Learned? Lessons from Afghanistan & Iraq,’ ” H-Diplo/ISSF, July 8, 2015, https://issforum.org/forums
/lessons-afghanistan-iraq-2; and Todd Greentree, “The Accidental Counterinsurgents: U.S. Performance in
Afghanistan,” in Learning the Lessons of Modern War, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2020), 157–78.
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the insurgents of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, along with
El Salvador’s record of searing human rights violations and low-quality
governance.39 Nevertheless, to judge by results, the stalemate between the Armed
Forces of El Salvador and Latin America’s toughest guerrilla army proved
sufficient to achieve US policy aims—Soviet/Cuban-backed communism was
contained, and democracy took hold.
More than chance links the wars in El Salvador to Afghanistan. In the late
1970s, both countries spiraled into violent instability and became gray-zone
cauldrons of the global Cold War.40 At the same time the Carter administration
began arming the Afghan mujahideen, it also laid the foundation of
US support for insurgency and counterinsurgency in Central America. Reagan
embraced and expanded the approach, even though the Iran-Contra scandal
nearly wrecked his second term, while George H. W. Bush sustained it for over
a decade with consistent strategy until the Cold War ended.41
The origin was the victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in
Nicaragua over US-client dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979.
Secured with Fidel Castro’s active support, the party’s victory was America’s
first failure to contain communist-backed revolution in Latin America since
Cuba in 1959. Neighboring El Salvador, on fire with leftist insurrection and
rightist repression, was the next Marxist-Leninist target. To avoid another loss
in Central America, the Carter administration took advantage of a reformist
coup in October 1979 to forge an uneasy partnership between the Salvadoran
armed forces and the Christian Democrat Party with the aim of building
a democratic center where none had survived before. The new government
offered change, but state terrorism sponsored by government security forces
and right-wing extremists also did its job, as the death squads eliminated
revolutionaries and sowed fear among the population. By 1981, the war had
morphed into a protracted insurgency. For the next three years, it was a
close-run thing. What made the difference was US commitment to a politicalmilitary strategy, dubbed “reform with repression,” in which counterinsurgency
39. Andrew J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, special report
(Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1988); Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front:
Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 217–88; and
Ryan T. Baker, “El Salvador, 1979–92: Revisiting Success,” in Berman and Lake, Proxy Wars, 137–58.
40. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985); Westad, Global Cold War; Robert Strausz-Hupé
et al., Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of Communist Strategy (New York: Harper Colophon Books,
1959); Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,”
PRISM 7, no. 4 (November 8, 2018): 30–47; and Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current
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during the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Todd Greentree, Crossroads of
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International, 2008).
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complemented and reinforced state-building.42 The joint venture between
Americans and Salvadorans was hardly friction free and, compared with arming
insurgent proxies, required entirely different types of responsibility and trust.
The tragedy of Vietnam was still fresh in the minds of the American
public and armed forces and proved a major strategic constraint. Aversion
to casualties and the prospect of another quagmire made it politically
imperative that containing Soviet-backed expansion in the Western
Hemisphere be pursued at the lowest possible level of cost and risk. On
succeeding Carter in January 1981, Reagan’s first foreign policy crisis was
El Salvador. To secure support, the new administration reached an
agreement with Congress to limit the Special Forces to 55 trainers.
So sensitive was the issue that, on March 3, in Reagan’s first television
interview as president, Walter Cronkite’s first question was, “Do you see any
parallel in our committing advisers and military assistance to El Salvador
and the early stages of our involvement in Vietnam?”43 Despite fears to the
contrary, Reagan assured the public he had no intention of sending US troops
into combat in Central America. This was America’s bright redline.
Counterinsurgency in El Salvador was more than a matter of keeping
US boots off the ground. Small COIN substituted economy of force for
combat power by focusing on training and assisting the Armed Forces of
El Salvador.44 By the mid-1980s, successive elections attracted strong
popular turnouts, even in contested areas, and the performance of the
Salvadoran Army gradually improved.45 Concern in the United States relaxed
as it became evident the situation had roughly stabilized.
Victory—in fact, any form of war termination—was no more a goal in
Central America than it was in Afghanistan. After all, the Cold War was
open-ended. Although El Salvador remained a source of controversy in
Congress, with escalation off the table and ground troops absent, the Reagan
and Bush administrations had sufficient means to manage US intervention
for the duration of the conflict. By the time of the Soviet demise, authentic
negotiations were underway between Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front insurgents and the Salvadoran government. With the signing of
42. William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, “Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,”
Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 (Summer 1980): 1084–1103.
43. “Excerpts from an Interview with Walter Cronkite of CBS News,” Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library and Museum, March 3, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/excerpts-interview
-walter-cronkite-cbs-news.
44. Fred F. Woerner, Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team, 1981, document now
declassified, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/DOCUMENT/930325.htm; and T. E. Lawrence, Article 15,
“Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917.
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the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992, the war ended definitively. The
Salvadoran civil war was protracted, but it was not endless.

Afghanistan: The Afghan Way of War
In association with considering the Small COIN option, an alternative
course of action is available and raises the possibility America’s longest
war was unnecessary altogether. Such a counterfactual idea based on pure
speculation would court skepticism and be of little value. In Afghanistan,
however, not only did a concrete option exist, it was proposed for decision
at the time but summarily rejected.
By mid-November 2001, the Taliban had signaled the fall of their
emirate by abandoning Kabul. Mullah Omar—amīr al-mu’minīn, the
Taliban’s commander of the faithful—fled from Kandahar to Pakistan. This
culminating point of victory, married to the formation of a new government
in Bonn, should have led to war termination but regrettably did not.
As coalition forces searched for enemies and followed the American way
of war, something else was happening. In accord with the very different
Afghan way of war, thousands of Taliban, ranging from erstwhile cabinet
ministers to young recruits, had ceased fighting and were streaming in to
swear fealty to the winning side.46 Karzai’s fledgling government was
prepared to agree not to punish them; they would be welcome to resettle
in their communities while enjoying benefits such as keeping their
AK-47s for protection and receiving help to reunify family members
residing in Pakistan. Nearly all Taliban were Pashtun; in seeking to
negotiate, they were recognizing the authority of their new leader, Hamid
Karzai, who shared their Islamic identity and possessed traditional
legitimacy, both as a Southern Pashtun aristocrat from the Popalzai tribe
and by virtue of his consensual endorsement by loya jirga in Bonn.
Karzai had a long association with the Taliban. Even though they
had assassinated his father in 1999 and had tried to kill him just weeks
earlier, he called them “my brothers.”47 However unfathomable this
reconciliation may have been to Westerners, it fit the fluid pragmatism
of Afghan politics and was strategic. The intent was to pacify and separate
46. Robert Warburton, Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879–1898 (London: John Murray, 1900); and Robert
Johnson, The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2011).
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Ipso Facto Publishers, 2014); and Hamid Karzai, “We Afghans Are Just Being Used against Each Other,”
interview by Susanne Koelbl, Spiegel International, May 22, 2021, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world
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them from their Pakistani patrons while consolidating Karzai’s leadership
and establishing a basis to stabilize Afghanistan. Once the Taliban dispersed
to their communities across southern and eastern Afghanistan, only limited
security forces would be needed to ensure their loyalty and prevent them from
reconstituting, even if some hardcore leaders remained on the other side of
the border and continued to enjoy sponsorship from Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence, the ISI.48
In December 2001, however, when Karzai and other Afghans advocated
inviting a few Taliban representatives (vetted for their willingness to
reconcile) to the Bonn conference, the Bush administration, along with
non-Pashtuns from the Northern Alliance, vetoed the idea.49 Seasoned UN
negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi would later call this act the “original sin.”50
US leaders were simply unprepared to comprehend how magnanimity after
victory could be the best way to terminate the war and bring order to
Afghanistan. Instead, the CIA and special operations forces and willing
Afghan partners set about killing or capturing the Taliban, thus provoking
an insurgency where none had existed.51
Had this course of action been adopted, an entirely different set of
strategic circumstances may very well have evolved. As reprehensible as the
Taliban were, they had been defeated. They were not the enemy; al-Qaeda
was. Even while counterterrorist operations continued, the United States
and its allies should have focused on restoring order, training, and assisting
Afghan security forces with more sustainable numbers, perhaps 50,000, while
standing in the way of interference from Pakistan. We should have listened
to the Afghans; it was their war to finish. Instead, by taking over, the
United States caught the whirlwind. As Clausewitz observed, “in war too
small an effort can result not just in failure, but in positive harm.”52 The same
is true of excessive force unwisely applied.
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Conclusion—A Failure of Judgment
Strategic failure in the Afghan war was not a case of how the weak win,
but how the strong lose.53 It was neither preordained nor a matter of
chance. The United States took over because it could. Notwithstanding the
urgency of combating terrorism, making war on the Taliban was a failure of
judgment and not in the national interest.54 Once again, the core of the problem
was the long-attested and largely disregarded overmilitarization of American
foreign policy.55 Small COIN using the El Salvador model, which balanced
political and military strategies while keeping US troops out of combat, could
have avoided an unnecessary war. It was worth a try. The warning is specific—
if one finds oneself accidentally fighting Big COIN, it is too late.
If the US military was the instrument of failure, the error was
misconceiving the situation in Afghanistan and ignoring the basic dictates of
strategy. Here, responsibility lies with key US decisionmakers who believed
they were masters of a technology-driven revolution in military affairs
endowed with boundless power to reshape the nature of war. This hubris,
combined with the panic of 9/11 and the opening of a new theater in Iraq,
explains but does not excuse their folly. They should have known better.
Unconstrained by the political imperative that kept combat forces out of El
Salvador, and like the US leaders, who with heedless arrogance, delivered
disaster in Vietnam, they may have been brilliant, but they behaved as fools. 56
Next time, we can and we must do better.
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